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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROPOSED
MINNESOTA FAIR EMPLOYMENT
PRACTICES ACT
By EDWARD F. WAITE*
T HAT the effort which was made in the last two sessions of the
Minnesota legislature to pass a so-called "FEPC bill" will be
vigorously renewed at the next session is certain. Its purpose was
to remove obstacles to gainful employment often encountered by
certain minority groups of citizens who solely by reason of race,
color or religion are at a disadvantage as compared with others
when they look for jobs, and in their relations with employers
when work has been secured. The fact of such discrimination, not
universal but widespread, no one questions, and all but a few
recognize its essential injustice. In general it is condoned only
when regarded as inevitable under existing social, economic and
political conditions.
Events of the last decade at home and abroad have focussed
public attention on this and similar discriminations, and a rapidly
increasing number of our citizens have become interested in the
correction of recognized evils. In the field of employment the idea
of remedy by law is of recent origin. The earliest attempt of which
the writer is aware was in New York in 1939, and that state
passed in 1945 the first general statute with this objective, New
Jersey following a month later with an act identical in principle
but differing in procedure and remedy. The President's FEPC
Order of 1941, a war measure, brought the general subject into the
forum of national discussion.
In Minnesota a bill entitled a "Law Against Discrimination"
was introduced in the 1945 legislature but was never brought to
vote. In 1947 a "Fair Employment Practices Act" was proposed
and met a like fate. It was carefully prepared in the office of the
Attorney General at the request of Governor Luther W. Young-
dahl and in collaboration with the Governor's Interracial Commis-
sion, appointed by Governor Thye in 1943. The bill (S.F. 622;
H.F. 806) was broadly" modeled upon the New York law and
followed the general pattern of federal labor legislation which had
stood the tests of the courts. Since this Minnesota bill will doubt-
less retain substantially the same form when introduced in 1949
a summary is presented here.
*Judge of the District Court for the Fourth District, Minnesota, 1911-
1941 (retired).
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The title states as its purpose-"To eliminate practices of dis-
crimination in employment because of race, religion, color or
national origin." Such discrimination is declared to be "an unfair
employment practice," and a concern of the state in that it "threat-
ens not only the rights and privileges of its inhabitants, but menaces
the institutions and foundations of the free democratic state." It
purports to be "an exercise of the police power of the state for the
protection and promotion of the public welfare, health and peace
of the people of the state."
It applies to employers, labor unions and employment agencies,
but does not cover employers of less than twenty persons, social
or fraternal groups, charitable, educational or religious associations
or corporations not organized for private profit, or persons em-
ployed in domestic service or by their parent, spouse or child.
Section 5, defining unfair employment practices, is as follows:
"It shall be an unfair employment practice: (1) For an em-
ployer, because of the race, religion, color or national origin of any
individual, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge
from employment such individual or to discriminate against such
individual in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment; (2) For a labor organization because of the race,
religion, color, or national origin of any individual, to exclude or to
expel from its membership such individual or to discriminate in
any way against any of its members or against any employer or
any individual employed by an employer; (3) For an employment
agency to discriminate in listing, classifying, referring or otherwise
against any individual because of race, religion, color, or national
origin unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification; (4)
For any employer, labor organization or employment agency to
discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate against any person be-
cause he has opposed any practices forbidden under this act or
because he has filed a petition, testified or assisted in any proceed-
ing under this act; (5) For any person, whether an employer or an
employee or not, to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of
any of the acts forbidden under this act, or to attempt to do so."
There is created a Fair Employment Practice Commission of
fifteen persons appointed by the Governor to serve without com-
pensation. The Governor also appoints, with the consent of the
Senate, a director for a term of five years at an annual salary of
$5,000. The commission and director are charged with the ad-
ministration of the act, the duties of the former being chiefly ad-
visory and educational; those of the latter, executive, to investi-
gate and correct alleged unfair employment practices.
A person claiming to be the subject of an unfair employment
practice may file a sworn petition with the director stating his
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grievance. The director thereupon investigates and if it appears
to have substantial ground he seeks adjustment by "conference,
conciliation and persuasion." Failing, he refers the matter to the
commission which, if it finds that "all practicable means of con-
ciliation have been undertaken" and deems that further proceed-
ings are warranted, makes findings and recommendations. The
director then issues a formal complaint and the person complained
against (respondent) has ten days to answer. The complaint with
a full report of efforts at conciliation, the answer and the findings
and recommendations of the commission are filed with the Gover-
nor, who may appoint a board of review consisting of three mem-
bers to determine the matter. The chairman must be an attorney-at-
law. This board, with power to adniinister oaths and subpoena
witnesses, hears the matter in the county where the controversy
arose. The hearing is informal in that the board is not bound by
the technical rules of evidence, and the testimony is transcribed.
Any party to the proceeding may appear in person or by attorney
or other representative. If the charge is found not proven the
complaint is dismissed; otherwise the board makes findings of fact
and an order to "cease and desist" from the unlawful practice,
together with such affirmative action as in its judgment "will ef-
fectuate the purposes of this act," including the hiring, reinstate-
ment or upgrading by an employer, and admission or restoration
to membership in a labor organization. The director or any party
in interest may obtain a review by the district court and the
director may proceed in that court to enforce, through contempt
proceedings, any order not complied with. The court has before
it a transcript of the record and may take additional testimony or
remand the case to the board for that purpose. The board's find-
ings are conclusive as to the facts "if supported by sufficient evi-
dence on the record considered as a whole." The judgment and
order of the district court are final, subject to review by the state
Supreme Court by way of certiorari.
It is not the purpose of this study to consider the bill from
the standpoint of private conscience or public policy. We shall
discuss only its constitutional validity.
When government says to an American citizen that in his
private business he may not refuse to hire an applicant for em-
ployment for any reason which seems to him sufficient he instinc-
tively rebels. He may have been compelled to discard membership
in a labor union as a ground for rejection; but it has been a bitter
pill to many. "That," they will say, "is enough !" The public, too.
1948]
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is likely to be somewhat shocked by what seems at first impression
to be a high-handed interference with a private right. If a merchant
can freely refuse to hire a white saleswoman just because he does
not like her looks, why may he not turn down a Negro girl just
because she is colored? The most enthusiastic champion of legisla-
tion of this sort must be aware that even when he has convinced
his fellow-citizens that such discriminations as are specified in the
bill are unjust and unwise, the burden remains heavily upon him
to show that compulsory measures may be had without violation
of cherished constitutional rights.
That there has been confusion in this field not only in the
minds of laymen but among lawyers who have not given careful
attention to the subject, must be apparent to all who have followed
the current discussion of FEP laws and proposals. This study
is an attempt to clarify the atmosphere. If the power the legislature
is asked to exercise were power directly to enforce a private "right"
(whether we call it "natural," "fundamental," or "civil") of the
applicant that he shall not be excluded from a private job of his
own choosing, which he is fitted to perform, solely because of ra6e,
color, religion or national origin, difficult questions would arise.
Interesting as they might be it is not necessary to discuss them
here. The power invoked in the bill is not power to enforce a pri-
vate right, but is expressly declared to be the "police power" of the
state to provide for the general welfare. The question of the con-
stitutionality of the bill is simply this,--Is it or is it not a proper
exercise of this power?
It is a truism among lawyers, and pretty well understood by
intelligent laymen, that in the field of legislation which undertakes
to regulate private conduct the powers of congress are much more
restricted than are those of the state legislatures. In determining
whether the bill in question would be subject to attack on constitu-
tional grounds it is not necessary to consider whether Congress
could enact substantially the same statute. The ultimate inquiry is
as to the validity of a state law. But passing the test of the state
constitution in the courts of the state is not enough. Another test
remains,--is it obnoxious to the constitution of the United States-
for that, as interpreted and applied by the United States Supreme
Court is the law of the land and binding upon the several states.
That court has the power, and when properly applied to, the duty
to apply the standards of the federal constitution not only to federal
laws, but also, in appropriate fields, to state constitutions and laws.
,[Vol. 32:349
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If, after being duly enacted, the law should be contested in the
state courts on constitutional grounds, every possible point of
attack could be ultimately reviewed by the Supreme Court of the
United States; for if it invades the private rights of any inhabitant
of the state beyond the point to which such rights must yield to the
police power of the state, that court could grant redress because a
right of a citizen or inhabitant of the United States has been in-
vaded. We shall therefore proceed to consider the bill under the
federal constitution and the applicable decisions of the federal
Supreme Court." The bill covers several aspects of the same general
subject and many procedural details. It is not practicable to discuss
within the limits of this study every detail which ingenious lawyers
might possibly attack. The essential questions are whether the
general purpose of the bill and the compulsion exercised to effect
that purpose are within the police power of the state. If so, there can
be no doubt that on ultimate review they would be upheld even
though minor features should be rejected.
The nature of the police power of the states and the United
States, its limits and the criteria by which the validity of its exer-
cise are to be determined, have been discussed in innumerable deci-
sions of the Supreme Court. In Nebbia v. New York,2 a much-
cited case decided in 1934, a New York statute was assailed as
repugnant to the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. We
quote from the majority opinion (Roberts, J.) 3
"Under our form of government the use of property and the
making of contracts are usually matters of private concern. The
general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference.
But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute, for
government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property
to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract
to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right
is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest ...
Justice Barbour said for this court :4 .. . it is not only the right,
but the bounden and solemn duty of the state, to advance the
safety, happiness and prosperity of its people, and to provide for
its general welfare, by any and every act of legislation which it
may deem to be conducive to these ends, where the power over the
particular subject, or the manner of its exercise, is not surrendered
or restrained in the manner just stated [i.e., by the federal consti-
tution and laws of Congress passed pursuant thereto]. All
1. Unless otherwise indicated the term "Supreme Court" will here-
after mean the Supreme Court of the United States.
2. (1934) 291 U. S. 502.
3. At pp. 523 et seq., and 537 et seq.
4. The Mayor, etc., of the City of New York v. Miln, (1837) 11 Pet.
102, 139.
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those powers which relate to merely municipal legislation, or
what may perhaps more properly be called internal police, are not
thus surrendered or restrained; and that, consequently, in rela-
tion to these the authority of the state is complete, unqualified and
exclusive.' .,. . Thus has this court from the early days affirmed
that the power to promote the general welfare is inherent in govern-
ment. Touching the matters committed to it by the constitution the
United States possesses this power, as do the states in their
sovereign capacity touching all subjects jurisdiction of which is
not surrendered to the federal government. . . .These correlative
rights, that of the citizen to exercise exclusive dominion over
property and freely to contract about his affairs, and that of the
state to regulate the use of property and the conduct of business,
are always in collision. No exercise of the private right can be
imagined which will not in some respect, however slight, affect
the public; no exercise of the legislative prerogative to regulate the
conduct of the citizen which will not to some extent abridge his
liberty or affect his property. But subject only to constitutional
restraint the private right must yield to the public need. The Fifth
Amendment, in the field of federal activity, and the Fourteenth,
as respects state action, do not prohibit governmental regulation
for the public welfare. They merely condition the exertion of the
admitted power, by securing that the end shall be accomplished by
methods consistent with due process. And the guaranty of due
process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall
not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means
selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the end sought
to be attained. It results that a regulation valid for one sort of
business, or in given circumstances, may be invalid for another
sort, or for the same business under other circumstances, because
the reasonableness of each regulation depends upon the relevant
facts .... So far as the requirement of due process is concerned,
and in the absence of other constitutional restriction, a state is
free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed
to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation
adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to
declare such policy, or when it is declared by the legislature, to
override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable rela-
tion to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied. ...
With the wisdom of the policy adopted, with the adequacy or prac-
ticability of the law enacted to forward it, the courts are both
incompetent and unauthorized to deal. The course of decision in
this court exhibits a firm adherence to these principles. Times
without number we have said that the legislature is primarily the
judge of the necessity of such an enactment, that every possible
presumption is in favor of its validity, and that though the court
may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may
not be annulled unless palpably in excess of legislative power."
[Vol. 32:349
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West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,5 decided in 1937, involved a
State of Washington law regulating working conditions and wages
of women and minors. The law was upheld, and Adkins v. Chil-
dren's Hospital," an earlier case which had been regarded as estab-
lishing a contrary doctrine, was expressly over-ruled. We quote
from the opinion of Chief Justice Hughes :7 "The principle which.
must control our decision is not in doubt. The constitutional pro-
vision invoked is the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment governing the states, as the due process clause invoked in the
Adkins case" [Fifth Amendment] "goverced Congress. In each
case the violation alleged. . . is deprivation of freedom of contract.
What is this freedom? The Constitution does not speak of freedom
of contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of
liberty without due process of law. In prohibiting that deprivation,
the Constitution does not recognize an absolute and uncontrollable
liberty . . . the liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social organiza-
tion which requires the protection of law against the evils which
menace the health, safety, morals and welfare of the people. Liberty
under the Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the restraints
of due process, and regulation which is reasonable in relation to
its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due
process. . . . In dealing with the relation of employer and em-
ployed, the legislature has necessarily a wide field of discretion in
order that there may be suitable protection of health and safety,
and that peace and good order may be promoted through regula-
tions designed to insure wholesome conditions of work and freedom
from oppression."
That "the law of the land" is as thus stated in clear and un-
mistakable language there can be no question; and it is therefore
plain that subject to the test of "reasonableness" the legislation
we are considering would be a valid exercise of the police power
of the State of Minnesota. But what is reasonableness? The term
is difficult-probably impossible-of precise definition as a legal
concept; but one gets a fair working idea of its meaning when it
is said that an "arbitrary," "capricious" or "discriminatory" (that
is, making distinctions based upon differences which clearly do
not justify them) law is unreasonable. The reluctance with which
the Supreme Court would substitute its own judgment for that of
the state legislature is declared in the Nebbia case and has been
abundantly demonstrated. Nevertheless there have been instances
5. (1937) 300 U. S. 379.
6. (1923) 261 U. S. 525.
7. At pp. 391 et seq.
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when attempts by the states to exercise their police power for what
was deemed to be the common welfare have been stricken down
as unreasonable, and the Supreme Court's authority to do this must
be reckoned with.
As indicated above by Justice Roberts, the question of reason-
ableness is always a relative one, to be ansvered according to the
best judgment of the Court after giving great weight to the con-
clusions of the legislature and applying the legislative purpose to
the facts of the particular case. Since no law which has attempted
to accomplish the specific purpose embodied in the Minnesota bill
has ever come before the Supreme Court there is no absolute
yardstick, in the form of a precedent, by which the bill can be
measured in advance to determine whether it would be found reason-
able as an attempt to promote the general welfare of the people
of Minnesota. But there are decided cases which are in varying
degrees analagous and which throw light upon our question. Some
of these we shall proceed to consider :8
REASONABLENESS OF THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF THE BILL
The manner and degree in which the public is interested in
preventing unemployment is germane to our inquiry. The bill
relates to "practices" in employment,--a term which implies an
attitude toward groups. If to prevent widespread unemployment
is a reasonable exercise of police power, that must also be true
with respect to groups of sufficient numbers to warrant public
concern. We therefore quote from Carndchael v. Southern Coal
and Coke Co.,9 decided in 1937 and involving the constitution-
ality of an Alabama Unemployment Compensation Act, which
was assailed, among other grounds, as violative of the due process
and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
upholding the Act the court (by Justice Stone) said: ". . . the
legislature could have concluded that unemployment brings in its
wake increase in vagrancy and crimes against property, reduction
in the number of marriages, deterioration of family life, decline
in the birth rate, increase in illegitimate births, impairment of the
health of the unemployed and their families and malnutrition of
their children. . . . The end being legitimate the means is for
8. It is the aim of the writer to avoid tedious multiplicity of citations.
Each case cited is believed to represent the present attitude of the court, and
reference to it will disclose supporting authorities. Since the purpose of this
study is not to present a legal brief but to clarify the public mind on the
principles involved, there is free quotation of the language of the court,
even though possibly not essential to the point decided.
,9. (1937) 301 U. S. 495.
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the legislature to choose. When public evils ensue from individual
misfortunes or needs, the legislature may strike the evil at its
source."10
It seems clear that the general subject of private employment
is within the domain of the state's police power and subject to
reasonable regulation. In fact such regulation is familiar,-for
example, laws against child-labor, and regulating hours and other
conditions of employment in the interest of public health and
safety. And this is equally true of the national government when
limited to subjects or territory which are within its jurisdiction.
It is therefore appropriate to consider cases involving questions
relating to employment which have arisen under federal as well
as state laws.
We find many Supreme Court opinions in which a "right"
to employment is expressly declared. This expression would be
misleading if it were not noted that the right referred to is the
right of a group to pursue an occupation without discriminating
exclusion by law, and not the right of an individual to a particular
job against the free choice of the proposed employer; a right
which may be exercised by independent preference, and not a
right which involves the concurrence of another person. To hold
that Chinese laundries must be free to operate on equal terms with
others in the same business is quite different from holding that
Yick Wo cannot be refused a job in a laundry simply because he
is of Chinese origin." But although such cases are not directly
in point in this inquiry, the carefully considered language of the
eminent lawyers who have sat in our highest court is important
in disclosing the intellectual and moral atmosphere in which our
present question ought to be considered.
In Butchers' Union Slaughter House, etc. Co. vs. Crescent
City Livestock, etc. Co.,' 2 decided in 1884, a sequel of the
Slaughter House Cases,'2 Justice Field said in a concurring opinion:
"Among these inalienable rights, as proclaimed by that great
document [the Declaration of Independence] is the right of men
to pursue their happiness, by which is meant the right to pursue
any lawful business or vocation in any manner not inconsistent
with the equal rights of others, which may increase their pros-
perity or develop their faculties, so as to give to them their
highest enjoyment. The common business and callings of life, the
10. At pp. 516 et seq.
11. (1886) 118 U. S. 356.
12. (1884) 111 U. S. 746.
13. (1873) 16 Wall. 36.
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ordinary trades and pursuits, which are innocuous in themselves
and have been followed in all communities from time immemorial,
must, therefore, be free in this country to all alike under the same
conditions.'1
4
In Powell vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania'5 Justice Harlan
said: "The main proposition advanced by the defendant is that his
enjoyment upon terms of equality with others in similar circum-
stances of the privilege of pursuing an ordinary calling or trade
. . . is an essential part of his rights of liberty and property as
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The court assents to
this general proposition as embodying a sound principle of con-
stitutional law.' 6
In Allegeyer vs. Louisiana,17 Justice Peckham said for the
unanimous court: "The liberty mentioned in that Amendment [the
Fourteenth] means not only the right of the citizen to be free
from the mere physical restraint of his person . . . but the term
is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the
enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful
ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by
any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation. .. ."
And he quotes with approval the declaration of Justice Bradley, in
another concurring opinion in the Butchers' Union case above
cited, that "the right to follow any of the common occupations of
life is an inalienable right."
Truax vs. Raich,19 is an interesting case which has various
points of relevancy to this discussion and should be read in full.
We quote only the following passage from the opinion by Justice
Hughes: "It is sought to justify this Act [an Act frankly designed
to limit the employment of aliens merely by reason of their
non-citizenship] as an exercise of the power of the state to make
reasonable classifications in legiglating to promote the health, safety,
morals and welfare of those within its jurisdiction. But this admitted
authority, with the broad range of legislative discretion that it
implies, does not go so far as to make it possible for the state to
deny to lawful inhabitants, because of their race or nationality,
the ordinary means of earning a livelihood. It requires no argument
to show that the right to work for a living in the ordinary occupa-
tions of the community is of the very essence of the personal
14. At p. 757 of 111 U. S.
15. (1888) 127U. S. 678.
16. At p. 684.
17. (1897) 165 U. S. 578.
18. At p. 589.
19. (1915) 239 U. S. 33.
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freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the [14th]
Amendment to secure. . . If this could be refused solely upon
the ground of race or nationality, the prohibition of the denial
to any person of the equal protection of the laws would be a
barren form of words. It is no answer to say, as is argued, that
the act proceeds upon the assumption that 'the employment of
aliens, unless restrained, was a peril to the public welfare.' The
discrimination against aliens in the wide range of employments
to which the act relates is made an end in itself, and thus the
authority to deny to aliens, upon the mere fact of their alienage, the
right to obtain support in the ordinary fields of labor, is necessarily
involved."20
New Negro Alliance vs. Sanitary Grocery Co.,2' involved a con-
struction of the Norris-La Guardia Act. It was so construed as to
protect peaceful picketing by Negroes of a concern which refused
to employ Negroes. Justice Roberts said for the court: "The desire
for fair and equitable conditions of employment on the part of
persons of any race, color or persuasion, and the removal of dis-
criminations against them by reason of their race or religious beliefs
is quite as important to those concerned as fairness and equity in
terms and conditions of employment can be to trade or craft unions
or any form of labor organization or association. Race discrimina-
tion by an employer may reasonably be deemed more unfair and
less excusable than discrimination against workers on the ground
of union affliliation. There is no justification in the apparent
purposes or the express terms of the Act for limiting its definition
of labor disputes and cases arising therefrom by excluding those
which arise with respect to discrimination in terms and conditions
of employment based upon differences in race or color."
REASONABLENESS OF THE SELECTION OF GRouPs WHICH ARE
PROTECTED BY THE BILL
What is aimed at in the bill is discrimination deemed to be harm-
ful to the public welfare. If there actually exists, or may be reason-
ably apprehended, a common practice involving any group, so
widespread as to be a proper matter for community concern, that
group may be made the subject of appropriate remedial legislation.
This is precisely the principle involved in child-labor laws and
practically all forms of "social" legislation. Every court will take
20. At pp. 41 et seq.
21. (1938) 303 U. S. 552.
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judicial notice of the fact that there exist very generally through-
out the United States, varying in object and degree according to
local conditions, popular attitudes of mind toward certain minority
groups which interfere with their equality of opportunity, as
compared with others, to freely order their own lives in many
ways, including work to earn a living. Cases growing out of these
attitudes (people who deprecate them call them "prejudices")
have often come before the courts, and it cannot be questioned
that the persons discriminated against are usually those who differ
from the majority in race, religion, color or national origin. Surely
the Supreme Court will not hold that the Minnesota legislature
exercises the police power of the state unreasonably when it con-
cludes that those whose equality of opportunity the bill seeks to
protect are groups whose status, without protection, imperils the
general welfare of the community.2 2 Should the rather tenuous
objection be made that the bill unlawfully discriminates in limiting
its application to the classes specified, an answer is found in the
following language of the Court in the West Coast Case23 above
cited, where this point was urged: "This court has frequently held
that the legislative authority, acting within its proper field, is not
bound to extend its regulation to all cases which it might possibly
reach. The legislature is free to recognize degrees of harm and it
may confine its restrictions to those classes of cases where the
need is deemed to be the clearest." 24
REASONABLENESS OF PROCEDURAL AND COM'PULSORY
FEATURES OF THE BILL
The summary of procedure presented above suggests meticulous
care in safeguarding the interests of all persons against whom
enforcement might be directed. Surely if the purpose of the bill
is a valid one the prescribed proceedings are not plainly "arbitrary,
capricious or discriminatory."
Regulation by Congress of private business in fields to which
the limited jurisdiction of the federal government extends has
become familiar; and the administrative features of such laws have
22. As evidence of the popular sense of need for legislation of the
sort we are considering it may be observed that FEPC bills with compulsory
provisions were introduced in the 1947 legislative sessions of 17 states. One
was passed in Connecticut. Massachusetts followed New York and Newjersey in 1946. Down to this writing (November, 1947) there has been no
court action to test the New York law. The approximately 1000 matters
handled under it have -been adjusted through conference and conciliation.
23. West Coast Hotel Co. v Parrish, (1937) 300 U. S. 379.
24. At p. 400.
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been often before the Supreme Court and upheld as proper exercise
of police power. Since, as we have seen, the Minnesota bill follows
the general plan of regulatory legislation as enacted by Congress,
the fact that the laws referred to have passed the judicial tests as
to detail as well as general scope is pertinent to this branch of
our inquiry.2-5
As declared in the New Negro Alliance case, the principle of
non-discrimination underlying the policy of the labor acts includes
the minority groups we are considering. Phelps Dodge Corp. vs.
National Labor Relations Board,28 is therefore relevant and im-
portant here. The employer had refused to hire two men solely
because of their affiliation with a labor union. The court was
unanimous in finding this to be an "unfair employment practice"
under the terms of the Act of July 5, 1935.27 Sec. 10 (c) of the
Act authorized the Board "to take such affirmative action, includ-
ing reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will
effectuate the policies of this Act." The court (opinion by Justice
Frankfurter) sustained the order of the Board that the two men,
who were held to be "employees" within the terms of the Act, be
hired, but modified it as relating to back pay. Justice Murphy, in
a separate opinion, upheld the Board's order in toto. Justice Stone,
speaking for himself and the Chief Justice, said: "We are not per-
suaded that Congress, by granting to the Board . . . authority
'to take such affirmative action, including reinstatement of employees
with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of the
Act,' has also authorized it to order the employer to hire applicants
for work who have never been in his employ, or to compel him to
give them 'back pay' for any period whatever. . . . Authority for
so unprecedented an excercise of power is not lightly to be inferred.
In view of the use of the phrase 'including reinstatement of em-
ployees,' as a definition and enlargement, as we think it is, of the
authority of the Board to take affirmative action, we cannot infer
from it a Congressional purpose to authorize the Board to order
compulsory employment and wage payments not embraced in its
terms." It will be observed that this dissent is based upon the two
Justices' interpretation of certain terms of the Act. The corres-
ponding terms of the Minnesota bill seem to be unambiguous.
25. See the elaborate opinions by Chief Justice Hughes sustaining the
Railway Labor Act and the National Labor Relations Act in Texas and
N. 0. R. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. and S. S. Clerks, (1930) 281 U. S.
546, and N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., (1937) 301 U. S. 1.
26. (1941) 313 U. S. 177.
27. 49 Stat. 449, 29 U. S. C. Sec. 151 et seq. (1935).
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REASONABLENESS OF APPLICATION OF THE BILL TO
LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
As to exclusion from membership, Railway Mail Assn. vs.
Corsi,2 a very recent case, is directly in point. For convenience
the writer quotes an analysis of this case prepared by him in another
connection :29 "In June, 1945, there was decided Railway Mail
Association vs. Corsi, an appeal from a state declaratory judgment
interpreting certain sections of the New York Civil Rights Law.
By these sections every labor organization was forbidden to deny
to any person membership or equal treatment by reason of his
race, color or creed. Appellant was an organization of postal clerks
which limited its membership to persons 'of the Caucasian race'
and native American Indians. It is claimed that it was not a labor
organization within the meaning of the law; and that, if it should
be found to be such, the sections under consideration violated the
due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment,
and were in conflict with the federal power over post offices and
post roads. All these points were found against the Association in
an opinion written by Justice Reed. Concerning due process he
said: 'We have here a prohibition of discrimination in membership
or union services on account of race, creed or color. A judicial
determination that such legislation violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment would be a distortion of the policy manifested in that amend-
ment which was adopted to prevent state legislation designed to
perpetuate discrimination on the basis of race or color. We see no
constitutional basis for the contention that a state cannot protect
workers from exclusion solely on the basis of race, color or creed
by an organization functioning under the protection of the state,
which holds itself out to represent the general business needs of the
employees.' Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, used
broader and more emphatic language: 'It is urged that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment precludes the State
of New York from prohibiting racial and religious discrimination
against those seeking employment. Elaborately to argue against
this contention is to dignify a claim devoid of constitutional sub-
stance. Of course a state may leave abstention from such discrimin-
ations to the conscience of individuals. On the other hand, a
state may choose to put its authority behind one of the cherished
aims of American feeling by forbidding indulgence in racial or
28. 326 U. S. 88 (1944).
29. Edward F. Waite, The Negro in the Supreme Court, (1946) 30
Minn. Law Rev. 219, 300, 301.
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religious prejudice to another's hurt. To use the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as a sword against such state power would stultify the Amend-
ment. Certainly the insistence by individuals on their private
prejudices as to race, color or creed, in relations like those now
before us, ought not to have a higher constitutional sanction than
the determination of the state to extend the area of non-discrimin-
ation beyond that which the Constitution itself exacts,' Justice
Rutledge concurred in the result."
As to other forms of discrimination Steele vs. L. & N. Ry. Co.30
is authoritative. The Chief Justice stated the point to be decided as
follows: "The question is whether the Railway Labor Act, 48
Stat. 1185 ... imposes on a labor organization, acting by authority
of the state as the exclusive bargaining representative of a craft or
class of railway employees, the duty to represent all the employees
in the craft without discrimination because of their race, and, if
so, whether the courts have jurisdiction to protect the minority of
the craft or class from the violation of such obligation." Under the
Railway Labor Act the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and
Enginemen was the exclusive representative of the craft for pur-
poses of bargaining. Negroes were excluded from membership in
the Brotherhood, which without notice to Negro employees, made
agreements with the railway company providing that vacancies as
they occurred should be filled by white men, and restricting the
seniority rights of Negro firemen. As a result Steele, who was a
fireman, lost a substantial amount of time, and was assigned to
harder and less remunerative work. He sought injunctive relief
which the Alabama courts denied. In reversing this it was held that
the agreements vere violative of the terms of the Act, which
were held to require that "the labor organization," chosen as
provided in the Act "to be the representative of the craft or
class of employees is thus chosen to represent all of its members,,
regardless of their union affiiliatfons or want of them. ...
Unless the labor union representing a craft owes some duty
to represent non-union members of the craft, at least to the
extent of not discriminating against them as such in contracts
which it makes as their representative, the minority would be
left with no means of protecting their interests, or, indeed, their
right to earn a livelihood by pursuing the occupation in which they
are employed.... Without attempting to mark the allowable limits
of differences in the terms of contracts based on differences of con-
ditions to which they apply, it is enough for present purposes to say
30. (1944) 323 U. S. 192.
1948]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
that the statutory power to represent a craft and to make contracts
as to wages, hours, and working conditions does not include the
authority to make among members of the craft discriminations not
based on such relevant differences. Here the discriminations based
on race alone are obviously irrelevant and invidious."'"
In a concurring opinion justice Murphy went somewhat fur-
ther: "The economic discrimination against Negroes practiced by
the Brotherhood and the railroad under color of Congressional
authority raises a grave constitutional question which should be
squarely faced. The utter disregard for the dignity and the well-
being of colored citizens shown by this record is so pronounced
as to demand the invocation of constitutional condemnation. To
decide the case and analyze the statute solely upon the basis of
legal niceties, while remaining mute and placid as to the obvious
and oppressive deprivation of constitutional guarantees, is to make
the judicial function something less than it should be. The consti-
tutional problem inherent in this instance is clear .... But it can-
not be assumed that Congress meant to authorize the representa-
tive to act so as to ignore the rights guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion. Otherwise the Act would bear the stigma of unconstitutionality
under the Fifth Amendment in this respect. For that reason I am
willing to read the statute as not permitting or allowing any action
by the bargaining representative in the exercise of its delegated
powers which would in effect violate the constitutional rights of
individuals. If the Court's construction of the statute rests upon
this basis, I agree. But I am not sure that such is the basis ...
The Constitution voices its disapproval whenever economic dis-
crimination is applied under authority of law against any race,
creed or color. A sound democracy cannot allow such discrimina-
tion to go unchallenged. Racism is far too virulent today to permit
the slightest refusal, in the light of a Constitution that abhors it,
to expose and condemn it whdever it appears in the course of a
statutory interpretation.
'3 2
REASONABLENESS OF APPLICATION OF THE BILL TO
EmPLOYMENT AGENCIES
Assuming that the definition of employment agencies 8 in Sec.
2 (2) is limited to those who are engaged in the business of ren-
dering the services indicated, and does not include one whose act
31. At pp. 203 et seq.
32. At pp. 209 et seq.
33. "The term Employment Agency includes any person undertaling
to procure employees or opportunities to work."
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is merely casual, Olson v. Nebraska3 4 (opinion by justice Douglas)'
seems to be determinative. Ribnik v. McBride35 was expressly
overruled. In 1927, in Tyson & Bro. v. Banton,8 justice Holmes
entered one of his famous dissents to the then prevailing attitude of
the court toward state regulation of private business. He did not
like the use of the terms "police power" and "affected with a
public interest" in this connection, and said: "I think that the
proper course is to recognize that a state legislature can do what-
ever it sees fit to do unless it is restrained by some express pro-
hibition in the Constitution of the United States or of the state,
and that courts should be careful not to extend such prohibition be-
yond their obvious meaning by reading into them conceptions of
public policy that the particular court may happen to entertain."
The Olson case was decided on this broad principle, and the deci-
sion was unanimous. It will hardly be claimed that if the general
purpose of the Minnesota bill is within legislative authority any
of the specifications of Sec. 5 (3) are unreasonable.
We shall not take space to discuss paragraphs (4) and (5) of
Sec. 5. They are collateral provisions in aid of the general purpose
of the bill,-germane and probably useful, but not essential. If
they should be stricken from the bill its substance would remain
intact.
Does it not therefore seem as certain as a matter to be deter-
mined by human judgment can ever be in advance of the actual test,
that this bill, if passed in substantially its 1947 form, will be held
constitutional ?37
34. (1941) 313 U. S. 236.
35. (1928) 277 U. S. 350.
36. (1927) 273 U. S. 418.
37. We have not discussed the "FEPC bill" (S. 984; H.R. 2824) now
pending in the national Congress. That bill contains the following language
in Sec. 2 (b) : "The right to employment without discrimination because of
race, religion, color, national origin or ancestry is hereby recognized as and
declared to be a civil right of all the people of the United States." Sec. 2 (d)
declares it to be "the policy of the United States to protect the right recog-
nized and declared in subdivision (b)." If this language introduces into the
federal bill considerations not directly involved in the Minnesota bill, the
foregoing discussion is nevertheless germane to the former, which invokes
the federal police power in declaring in Sec. 2 (a) "that the practice of
discrimination in employment against properly qualified persons because of
their race, religion, color, national origin or ancestry . . . forces large
segments of our population into substandard conditions of living, foments
industrial strife and domestic unrest, deprives the United States of the
fullest utilization of its capacities for production, endangers the national
security and the general welfare, and adversely affects the domestic and
foreign commerce of the United States." The scope of the bill. is carefully
limited to areas which are within federal jurisdiction, and where the national
police power is no more limited than is that of the states in their internal
affairs.
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